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Identifying new instances of illusion and hallucination provides much needed, important data for testing theories of experience and perception-theories that are frequently motivated, and should be judged, by their ability to account for cases of illusion and hallucination.
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But this is a ladder that, as Wittgenstein might say, can be thrown away once it is used. Such a conception of experience is simply a tool-a ladder to gain a good vantage point from which one can appreciate that there are these further cases. In order to accept that these new cases of illusion and hallucination exist in ordinary experience as of objects having properties, nothing turns on accepting the idea that there is pure property experience, or that olfactory experience is an instance of it. These consist in different combinations of veridical perception, illusory perception and hallucination of both objects and properties. Drawing on the ideas uncovered by considering pure property experience, we bring to light many new cases of illusion and hallucination within ordinary experience as of objects having properties. With these distinctions in hand, we re-examine ordinary cases of experiences as of objects having properties. We argue that, within instances of such pure property experience, one can identify cases of veridical property perception, illusory property perception and hallucinatory property experience. We suggest that some might find it to be plausible that olfactory experience is of this kind. We then proceed to outline cases of pure property experience-that is, experience as of properties, but not as of objects. In light of this, we present new and exhaustive definitions of illusion and hallucination.įirst, we explicate the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination. We argue that such cases show that the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination are incorrect because they do not identify all of the cases of non-veridical experience that they need to and they elide important differences between cases. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 117–125.In this paper, we present new cases of illusion and hallucination that have not heretofore been identified. (2017) Missing colors: The enactivist approach to perception. Key words: Enaction, perception, misrepresentation, comparability, high color space dimensionality, objectivism, subjectivism, computational science Citation Constructivist content: The presence of singular “visual channels”, as well as physical, sensorimotor and evolutionary factors, constrains our own perceptual experience as proposed by enactivism. We argue that an enactivist theory of visual perception may not only clarify the problematic consequences of those assumptions, but also fruitfully guide future philosophical and empirical research on this topic. Implications: Epistemological problems related to perception are here tackled, considering some controversial assumptions related to vision. Results: As shown, philosophy and computational science have recently incorporated concepts from neurobiology that close gaps between disciplines and support aspects of the enactivist approach of vision. Method: We carried out a literature survey to draw attention to the status of the enactivist theory of vision and to explore how the problems of misrepresentation and comparability may be tackled.
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We live with other creatures in sensory worlds that are not tractable, so could we share color-similar experiences? We are still missing an integrative enactive framework to tackle the problems of misrepresentation and comparability related to animal color experience. Problem: Varela held that the problem of misrepresentation and the comparability of visual experience were crucial. Context: Part of Varela’s work focused on the study of visual perception, particularly on the grounds of an enactivist theory of vision.